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Abstract 
Paranoia, unfounded fears that others intend harm, has predominately been studied in 
schizophrenia. Increasingly, it is recognised that there is a spectrum of severity of excessive 
mistrust across the general population. Relatively little is known about paranoia in individuals 
with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD), but rates could be expected to be higher given both 
difficulties in understanding others’ mental states and frequent experiences of negative social 
interactions. A systematic search of English-language peer-reviewed publications was 
undertaken to synthesise empirical research about paranoia in ASD. Seven studies, comprising 
a total of 180 ASD participants, met the inclusion criteria. All the studies were cross-
sectional, thereby limiting causal interpretations. Individuals with ASD were consistently 
found to have higher levels of paranoia compared to non-clinical controls, and lower levels 
than individuals with current psychotic experiences manifesting in the context of 
schizophrenia. Furthermore, the initial evidence indicates that paranoia in ASD may be 
linked with theory of mind performance, negative affect, and jumping to conclusions, but not 
attributional style. As in typically-developing populations, causal and maintaining mechanisms 
for paranoia in ASD, against a background of genetic and environmental risk, most likely 
include cognitive and affective processes interacting with social factors. We hypothesise 
however, that core ASD characteristics and associated neurocognitive impairments also serve 
to precipitate and perpetuate paranoia. A framework to guide further investigation is outlined. 
 
1 Introduction 
Autism spectrum disorders (ASD) are childhood onset, behaviourally defined, 
neurodevelopmental conditions. Core ASD characteristics include socio-communication 
impairments, adherence to non-functional rituals and routines, and engagement in a narrow 
repertoire of interests and activities (APA, 2014; WHO, 1992). ASD prevalence rates are 
reported to just exceed 1% of the population (Brugha et al., 2011), however given significant 
clinical heterogeneity, and potential sex differences in symptom profiles (Van Wijngaarden-
Cremers et al., 2014), it is conceivable that rates are underestimated (NICE, 2011, 2012).   
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Although diagnostic overshadowing may mar a full assessment of psychopathology, 
studies consistently indicate that individuals with ASD are highly likely to experience 
psychiatric co-morbidities (Joshi et al., 2013; Russell et al., 2015; Simonoff et al., 2008), 
including  anxiety disorders (White, Oswald, Olendick & Scahill, 2009), obsessive compulsive 
disorder (OCD) (Cadman et al., 2015), low mood and depression (Ghaziuddin, Ghaziuddin & 
Greden, 2002), and psychosis (Chisholm, Lin, Abu-Akel & Wood, 2015). Similarly, 
transdiagnostic characteristics – i.e. symptoms which can manifest across a range of psychiatric 
disorders – occur commonly. Such characteristics can include problems with eating and ‘food 
selectivity’ (Marí-Bauset, Zazpe, Mari-Sanchis, Llopis-González & Morales-Suáres-Varella, 
2014), sleep disturbance (Elrod & Hood, 2015), emotion dysregulation (Weiss, 2014), and 
paranoia (Blackshaw, Kinderman, Hare & Hatton, 2001). 
Recent research indicates that paranoia (ideas of reference and persecution) exists on 
a spectrum of severity in the general population (Freeman et al., 2005), similar to the profile of 
common mental health problems such as anxiety and depression (Plomin, Haworth & David, 
2009). This is unsurprising: every day, people make decisions about whether to trust or 
mistrust, but accurately judging the intentions of others is difficult. Many people have a 
few paranoid thoughts; a few people have many. One of the clearest demonstrations of 
this is that a significant minority of the non-clinical general population can have paranoid 
thoughts about neutral computer characters in immersive virtual reality social situations 
(Freeman et al., 2008). Paranoia is associated with youth, poverty, isolation, stress, use of 
cannabis, and a range of mental health disorders (Freeman et al., 2011). It is also 
associated with a range of adverse life experiences (e.g. Bentall et al., 2012). Analysis of 
data from a nationally representative population (N=8580) indicated that there is a single 
paranoia dimension, with ideas of persecution building on ideas of reference, which build 
on mistrust and interpersonal sensitivity (Bebbington et al., 2013). This notion of 
paranoia building on common concerns about the self in regard to interpersonal 
relationships is captured in the conceptualisation of a paranoia hierarchy (see Figure 1) 
(Freeman et al., 2005). The severity of paranoia varies in content, degree to which concerns 
are believed, and levels of distress and impairment. At the severe end are persecutory 
delusions, commonly seen in people who have psychosis or schizophrenia. The presence of 
persecutory delusions in those diagnosed with non-affective psychosis has led to paranoia 
predominately being studied in this patient population. However, paranoia is also 
associated with a range of other mental health disorders including social phobia 
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(Schutters et al., 2012), post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Freeman et al., 2013), 
depression (Wigman et al., 2012), and bipolar disorder (Goodwin & Jamison, 1990). 
The contribution of genetic and environmental causes to the occurrence of paranoia has 
been examined in one large classical twin design study (Zavos et al., 2014), whereby 
paranoia was assessed dimensionally in five thousand adolescent twin pairs; it was found 
that the contribution of genes and environment was approximately equal. Several 
psychological mechanisms have been hypothesised to precipitate and perpetuate paranoia 
(Frith, 1992; Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood & Kinderman, 2001; Freeman & Garety, 
2014). Since almost by definition mental states are being misread in paranoia, theory of mind 
impairments have been proposed as a cause (Frith, 1992). Similarly, the explanation of events 
in terms of malevolent others has implicated a generalised externalising and personalising 
attributional style linked to unstable and negative self-views (Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, 
Blackwood & Kinderman, 2001). Another view is that at the centre of paranoia are ideas about 
threat, linked to anxiety and depression, negative self-beliefs (including interpersonal 
sensitivity), and adverse life experiences (Freeman & Garety, 2014). Reasoning biases, such as 
‘jumping to conclusions’ (reduced data-gathering), have also been considered a contributory 
causal factor to the levels of conviction and failure to consider alternative explanations seen in 
paranoia (Garety et al., 2015). 
 
Figure 1 about here. 
 
Enhancing understanding of paranoia in ASD is important for several reasons. Our 
view is that it is theoretically plausible that this clinical population are at an increased risk of 
paranoid ideation. This increased risk may stem, in part, from the social consequences of 
having ASD. For example, individuals who have ASD desire friendships and intimate 
relationships, yet they are often rebuffed, and are prone to being bullied and victimised 
(Schroeder, Cappadocia, Bebko, Pepler & Weiss, 2014); experiences which can exacerbate 
social withdrawal, augment concerns about others, and encourage negative beliefs about the 
self and others (e.g. Gracie et al., 2007). But it may also be that neurocognitive processes 
associated with ASD enhance the likelihood of paranoia. Difficulties in understanding 
others’ intentions (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001a), a tendency for 
being detail-focused (commonly referred to as weak central coherence; Happé & Frith, 2006), 
and problems with cognitive flexibility (Wilson et al., 2014) may render individuals with ASD 
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vulnerable to information or interpretation biases, encouraging the negative misinterpretation 
of others’ actions.  
In summary, although paranoia may well co-occur with ASD, it is unclear whether rates 
and levels are comparable to those reported for typically-developing clinical and non-clinical 
populations. Also, it is uncertain whether there is a degree of ASD-specificity to paranoia, i.e. 
whether core ASD or associated characteristics serve to precipitate or maintain paranoid 
features. In the typically-developing population, there is increasing evidence to suggest that 
timely assessment and psychological interventions (specifically cognitive behaviour therapy 
(CBT)) can reduce paranoia, associated distress, and secondary symptoms (e.g. Freeman et al., 
2015). Whether this is also the case for the ASD population warrants consideration. The aims 
of this review were threefold: (1) to synthesise empirical data about ASD and paranoia; (2) to 
propose a conceptual framework outlining mechanisms potentially contributing to the 
development and maintenance of paranoia; and (3) to highlight implications for clinical 
practice and research. 
 
2 Method 
2.1 Search strategy 
Four databases were searched – Medline, PsycInfo, PubMed, and the Cochrane Central 
Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL) – from the date of inception until 19 April 2015. 
The search terms used were autis*- asperger*- pervasive development* disorder* AND 
paranoi*.  
 
2.2 Study inclusion and exclusion criteria  
We employed several search parameters, as follows: (1) primary observational, 
experimental or intervention studies; (2) published in peer-reviewed English language 
publications; and (3) focusing on paranoia (measured using clinical diagnostic criteria, or a 
subjective self-rating scale) in young people or adults with ASD (including all diagnostic sub-
types). We allowed for the possibility that study participants may have additional co-
morbidities and/or intellectual disability (ID). We excluded: (1) grey literature (including non-
peer-reviewed and non-academic publications); and (2) studies that included participants 
diagnosed with ASD and psychosis (or schizophrenia), but where reports did not demarcate 
paranoid features from other positive symptoms of psychosis.  
 
2.3 Analysis plan  
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A narrative approach to the analysis was undertaken, due to methodological 
heterogeneity.  
 
3 Results 
3.1 Search results and data extraction  
The database searches were undertaken by JS; results were imported into EndNote 
version 7. See Figure 2 for an overview of the search results. An initial 228 studies were 
retrieved. Duplicates (n=103) were removed, and the titles of the remaining 125 papers 
were reviewed independently by JS and DS. Twenty-four papers were deemed to 
potentially meet the review inclusion criteria. Of these, 18 papers were excluded, either 
as these constituted reviews (Carpenter, 2007; Schneier, Blanco, Antia & Liebowitz, 
2002), or as there were no paranoia data about individuals with ASD (Skokauskas & 
Gallagher, 2012), or because the studies did not report outcome measures pertaining to 
paranoia in individuals with ASD (Bara, Ciaramidaro, Walter & Adenzato, 2011; 
Collacott, Cooper & McGrother, 1992; Couture, Penn, Losh, Adolphs, Hurley & Piven, 
2009; Gutkovich, Carlson & Carlson, 2007; Hallerbäck, Lugnegård & Gillberg, 2012; 
Konstantareas & Hewitt, 2001; Murphy, 2006; Pary, 1993; Pilowsky, Yirmiya, Arbelle & 
Mozes, 2000; Prado de Oliveira, 1999; Shastri, Alla & Sabaratnam, 2006; Siegel et al., 
2014; Travé Rodriguez, Barreiro Marin, Galvez Borrero, del Olmo Romero-Nieva & 
Diaz Alvarez, 1994; Yan et al., 2000), or as paranoia outcome data about individuals with 
ASD were subsumed and subsequently analysed in a more recent paper (Pinkham, 
Hopfinger, Pelphrey, Piven & Penn, 2008). One further study was identified which was 
published during manuscript preparation, and sub-group data were obtained (Taylor et al., 
2015; MT personal communication, July 2015). A total of seven studies, therefore, met the pre-
specified inclusion criteria, which were read by all three authors. Data were extracted, 
summarised, and tabulated.  
 
Figure 2 about here. 
 
3.2 Overview of studies 
Seven studies, all employing cross-sectional designs, were included in the review 
(Blackshaw, Kinderman, Hare & Hatton, 2001; Craig, Hatton, Craig & Bentall, 2004; Jänsch 
& Hare, 2014; Maras & Bowler, 2012; North, Russell & Gudjusson, 2008; Pinkham et al., 
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2012; Taylor et al., 2015). See Table 1 for a summary of study details. All studies bar one 
(Pinkham et al., 2012), were undertaken in the UK.  
 
Table 1 about here. 
 
Each study described levels of paranoia in individuals diagnosed with ASD compared 
to control groups. The aims of studies differed somewhat: one study examined associations 
between autistic traits and psychotic experiences in adolescents (Taylor et al., 2015); three 
studies explored the link between theory of mind and paranoia (Blackshaw, Kinderman, Hare 
& Hatton, 2001; Craig, Hatton, Craig & Bentall, 2004; Jänsch & Hare, 2014); two studies 
investigated relationships between attributional style and paranoia (Blackshaw, Kinderman, 
Hare & Hatton, 2001; Craig, Hatton, Craig & Bentall, 2004); one study examined self-
representation and self-awareness in conjunction with paranoia (Blackshaw, Kinderman, Hare 
& Hatton, 2001); one study considered associations between probabilistic reasoning style and 
paranoia (Jänsch & Hare, 2014); one study assessed similarities and differences in paranoid 
ideation between clinical and non-clinical populations (Pinkham et al., 2012); three studies  
described levels of anxiety and depression, co-occurring with paranoia (Blackshaw, 
Kinderman, Hare & Hatton, 2001; Maras & Bowler, 2012; North, Russell & Gudjusson, 2008); 
and finally, two studies measured paranoia in the context of interrogative suggestibility, 
compliance and vulnerability (Maras and Bowler, 2012; North, Russell & Gudjusson, 2008).  
 
3.3 Participant characteristics 
A total of 180 individuals with ASD (152 males and 28 females) participated across 
studies, most of whom were diagnosed with Asperger’s Syndrome. ASD diagnosis was 
primarily confirmed via clinical criteria. Additionally, three studies (Jänsch & Hare, 2014; 
Maras & Bowler, 2012; Taylor et al., 2015) asked participants to complete the Autism Quotient 
(AQ; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin & Clubley, 2001b), four studies undertook 
the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS-g; Lord et al., 2000) with a proportion of 
participants (Maras & Bowler, 2012; North, Russell & Gudjusson, 2008; Pinkham et al., 2012, 
Taylor et al., 2015), and three studies (North, Russell & Gudjusson, 2008; Pinkham et al., 2012; 
Taylor et al., 2015) obtained data from the Autism Diagnostic Interview-revised (ADI-r; Lord, 
Rutter & Lecouteur, 1994).  
IQ data were estimated from the National Adult Reading Scale (NARS; Nelson, 1982), 
the National Adult Reading Test (NART; Nelson, 1991), the Wechsler Abbreviated Scales of 
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Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1991), the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS, 
Wechsler, 1999), or subscales from the Wechsler Intelligence Test for Children (WISC; 
Wechsler, 2004). At group level, mean full scale IQs fell within the average range.  
There were limited data reported about other demographic characteristics (such as 
ethnicity), and clinical characteristics (such as psychiatric co-morbidity, or receipt of mental 
health services).   
 
3.4 Quality assessment of included studies  
We did not use a standardised checklist to formally assess methodological rigour of 
included studies. Nonetheless, several considerations are noteworthy when appraising the study 
methods and results. First, while ASD participants were recruited from clinical and non-
clinical settings, response rates (i.e. the percentage of participants who agreed to take part 
versus those who declined) were not provided. It may be that some individuals were 
deterred from taking part, given the study remits, thereby skewing the representativeness 
of samples. Second, ASD was not necessarily assessed using ‘gold-standard’ objective 
instruments: as such, the severity and spread of symptoms, i.e. whether participants presented 
with more social or communication impairments were not documented. Hence, the degree to 
which ASD participants within each study and across studies represent a homogeneous (or 
heterogeneous) group is not known, with implications for the generalisability of study 
findings. Third, each study relied on a single self-report measure of paranoia, completed at 
one time point. Given that the utility of self-report questionnaires in ASD remains a 
contentious issue, study methods could have been enhanced through inclusion of a clinician-
administered measure, or a second self-report paranoia scale, i.e. to establish construct 
validity or inter-rater reliability. It is also the case that self-report measures are unable 
to determine if paranoid ideas endorsed, are actually unfounded. Additionally, 
psychological variables examined in studies, including theory of mind, attributional and 
reasoning styles, self-esteem, and affect, were also primarily measured using one form of 
assessment; some of which were self-report instruments, and as such their validity and 
reliability for the ASD population is uncertain. Confidence in study results could 
therefore have been augmented with the addition of an alexithymia measure to ascertain 
the extent to which participants were able to describe their internal states, as well as 
further tests of neuropsychological functioning (e.g. local versus global processing styles, 
cognitive flexibility, recall and memory). Fourth, while appropriate choice of comparison 
group clearly depends on the key hypothesis tested, it is of note that each study included at 
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least one comparison group (a clinical and/or non-clinical control group), but no study included 
an ASD control group, i.e. either individuals with ASD who presented with no paranoia, or a 
comparison between individuals who have low and high levels of paranoia. As there are 
hypothesised differences between ASD and typically-developing individuals – for example, in 
terms of genetics (Miles, 2011), neuroanatomy (Stanfield et al., 2008), and neuropsychological 
functioning (Wilson et al., 2014) – it is possible that direct comparison with other ASD 
samples, or individuals with developmental disorders, would prove useful. Similarly, not 
all studies matched participant groups on baseline variables, including age, IQ, and 
potential past or current mental health. Given that these factors may influence or 
confound performance on tests, the implication is that results and inferences drawn may 
be called into question.  
 
3.5 Establishing rates of paranoia 
Three self-report measures of paranoia were used: the Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts 
Scale (GPTS; Green et al., 2008) (Jänsch & Hare, 2014); the Paranoia Scale (PS; Fenigstein & 
Vanable, 1992) (Blackshaw, Kinderman, Hare & Hatton, 2001; Craig, Hatton, Craig & Bentall, 
2004; Maras & Bowler, 2012; Pinkham et al., 2012), and the Specific Psychotic Experiences 
Questionnaire (SPEQ; Ronald et al., 2014) (Taylor et al., 2015). Each of the measures has 
previously been used with clinical and non-clinical populations, although only the GPTS was 
designed to be used for clinical purposes. While each questionnaire assesses thoughts and 
beliefs associated with, and indicative of paranoia, the PS focuses more specifically on 
mistrust, resentment and ideas of reference, having considerable overlap with anxious 
and depressive concerns, the GPTS investigates the conviction, preoccupation, and 
distress associated with ideas of reference and persecution (see Freeman (2008a) for a 
comprehensive overview), and the SPEQ examines a range of paranoid content but 
mainly milder more common ideas of reference and persecution in the general 
population. All of the measures are reported to have good psychometric properties, but none 
are specifically validated for the ASD population. 
In each study, ASD participants – at a group level – endorsed higher levels of paranoia, 
compared with non-clinical controls (Blackshaw, Kinderman, Hare & Hatton, 2001; Jänsch & 
Hare, 2014; Maras & Bowler, 2012; North, Russell & Gudjusson, 2008; Pinkham et al., 2012; 
Taylor et al., 2015). Conversely, ASD participants self-reported lower levels of paranoia 
compared to individuals diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia (Craig, Hatton, Craig & 
Bentall, 2004; Pinkham et al., 2012), and higher levels compared with a schizophrenia non-
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paranoid group (Pinkham et al., 2012). Pinkham et al. (2012) also put forward evidence that 
paranoia in ASD included a higher degree of ‘social cynicism’ compared to patients with 
schizophrenia, which they considered as evidence of qualitatively different factors leading 
to paranoia in ASD. 
 
3.6 Associations between autistic traits and paranoia 
 Taylor and colleagues (2015) examined relationships between autistic traits and 
paranoia in an adolescent sample, a proportion of which (n=32) were also diagnosed with ASD. 
Study findings indicated that associations between autistic traits (measured by the AQ; Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin & Clubley, 2001b) and paranoia (measured by the 
SPEQ; Ronald et al., 2014) narrowly failed to reach significance (r = 0.09, p = 0.06).   
 
3.7 Psychological variables associated with paranoia 
3.7.1 Theory of mind  
Three studies investigated theory of mind, either using the Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes Task (RMET; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001a) (Craig, Hatton, 
Craig & Bentall, 2004; Jänsch & Hare, 2014), the Hints Task (Corcoran, Mercer & Frith, 1995) 
(Craig, Hatton, Craig & Bentall, 2004), or the Projective Imagination Test (unpublished; 
Blackshaw, Kinderman, Hare & Hatton, 2001). Of these measures, the RMET has been most 
commonly used in ASD research, and has good psychometric properties (Baron-Cohen 
et al., 2015). In each study, theory of mind deficits were greater for individuals with ASD 
compared with non-clinical controls but comparable to participants with schizophrenia. 
Furthermore, Craig and colleagues (2004) found a negative correlation between scores on the 
PS (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) and theory of mind measures (RMET, r = -0.37, p = <0.01; 
Hints task, r = -0.25, p = <0.05), suggesting that neuropsychological functioning impairments 
may be implicated in paranoia in this group.  
 
3.7.2 Attributional style  
  Attributional style was measured using the Internal, Personal and Situational 
Attributions Questionnaire (IPSAQ; Kinderman & Bentall, 1996) (Blackshaw, Kinderman, 
Hare & Hatton, 2001) and the Attributional Style Structured Interview (ASSI; unpublished; 
Craig, Hatton, Craig & Bentall, 2004). At group level – and in both studies – there were no 
significant differences between attributional styles of participants with ASD, and non-clinical 
controls. Individuals with schizophrenia however, were more likely to ‘externalise attributions 
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for negative events’, and display a global attributional style, compared with ASD participants 
(Craig, Hatton, Craig & Bentall, 2004). Blackshaw and colleagues (2001) also examined 
correlations between attributional style, paranoia and theory of mind, and found no significant 
relationships between these variables (‘overall model’ - F (6, 24) = 1.75, p = 0.152).  
 
3.7.3 Self-representation and self-awareness 
 Self-awareness and self-representation were explored in one study via the Self-
Discrepancies Questionnaire (SDQ; adapted from Higgins, 1986, 1987) and the Self-
Consciousness Scale (SCS; Fenigstein, Scheier & Buss, 1975) (Blackshaw, Kinderman, Hare 
& Hatton, 2001). Given that individuals with ASD may experience innate difficulties in 
their ability to distinguish between self and others, and self-awareness, assessment of 
these constructs can prove complex but not insurmountable (see Hobson, 2010). 
Nonetheless, there were no significant differences in SDQ scores, between the ASD and non-
clinical control groups. However, individuals with ASD displayed significantly higher levels 
of private self-consciousness, and comparable levels of public self-consciousness and social 
anxiety. Using regression analyses, it was also reported that private self-consciousness was a 
potential predictor variable (in this cross-sectional study) for paranoia (beta = 0.529, t = 3.42, 
p = 0.0019). 
 
3.7.4 Reasoning style  
The data-gathering ‘jumping to conclusions’ (JTC) reasoning style was assessed in one 
study (Jänsch & Hare, 2014). Using a computerised version of the ‘beads task’ (Garety et al., 
2005) participants were asked to gather data in a reasoning task until they were sure in their 
judgement. There were significant differences, at group level, in the number of beads requested 
and rates of JTC bias. In both versions of the task, individuals with ASD made fewer requests 
for additional information: 50% of ASD participants displayed a JTC bias in version A, 
compared with 34% in version B. These rates are broadly comparable to those seen in 
studies of patients with delusions in the context of schizophrenia (Dudley et al, 2015).  
 
3.7.5 Anxiety and depression 
Self-ratings of anxiety and depression were obtained via the Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) (Blackshaw, Kinderman, Hare & Hatton, 
2001; North, Russell & Gudjusson, 2008), and the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; 
Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) (Maras & Bowler, 2012). In each of 
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these studies, ASD participants endorsed higher levels of depression and anxiety, compared 
with non-clinical controls. Differences between groups however, were only found to be 
significant by North and colleagues (2008).  
 
3.7.6 Fear of negative evaluation 
In order to investigate social-evaluative concerns about others, The Brief Fear of 
Negative Evaluation scale (BFNE; Leary, 1983) was administered in two studies (Maras & 
Bowler, 2012; North, Russell & Gudjusson, 2008). The BFNE has good psychometric 
properties, albeit that the questionnaire involves reverse-item scoring, which feasibly can 
prove confusing (e.g. Weeks et al., 2005).   In both studies, ASD participants endorsed more 
social evaluative concerns compared to non-clinical controls, albeit that differences between 
the groups were not significant. Potential associations between paranoia and FNE were not 
reported in detail.  
 
3.7.7 Self-esteem 
Self-esteem was measured by Maras and Bowler (2012), using the Rosenberg Self 
Esteem scale (RSE; Rosenberg, 1965); a measure commonly used with research and clinical 
populations, and which has good construct validity and a similar ‘factor structure’ across 
settings (e.g. Schmitt & Allik, 2005). At group level, there were no differences in mean scores: 
neither group scored within the low self-esteem range. 
 
3.7.8 Suggestibility, vulnerability and compliance 
Two studies investigated suggestibility and compliance in adults with ASD (Maras & 
Bowler, 2012; North, Russell & Gudjonsson, 2008), with the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale 
2 (GSS-2; Gudjonsson, 1997), and the Gudjonsson Compliance Scale (GCS; Gudjonsson, 
1989). There were no significant differences in scores, between groups, on the GSS-2 
(Gudjonsson, 1997). Group differences were found on the GCS (Gudjonsson, 1989) in one 
study (North, Russell & Gudjonsson, 2008): ASD participants had higher scores compared to 
the non-clinical control group. Relationships between scores on the GCS, the GSS-2 and the 
PS were examined in one study (Maras and Bowler, 2012): significant associations were found 
between the GSS-2 and PS in the ASD group only (r = 0.52, p < 0.01), a finding which was 
accounted for by the fact that a proportion of the participants had scored particularly highly.  
 
4 Discussion 
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4.1 Overview 
Paranoia is increasingly recognised as a common experience in the general population, 
but relatively little is known about this phenomenon in ASD. To address this gap, we carried 
out the first systematic review on the topic. Seven cross-sectional studies met the pre-specified 
review inclusion criteria, highlighting the relative neglect of this topic in research. Across all 
studies, ASD participants had higher levels of paranoia compared with non-clinical controls. 
Furthermore, individuals with ASD had lower levels of paranoia compared with individuals 
with current psychotic experiences in the context of schizophrenia. It was also found that 
associations between attributional style and paranoia were not significant; theory of mind 
impairments were comparable for the ASD and schizophrenia groups, and more severe 
compared to non-clinical controls; ASD participants had higher levels of anxiety, depression, 
and social-evaluative concerns, compared to non-clinical samples (albeit that not all differences 
reached significance); and there were indications that individuals with ASD had a jumping to 
conclusions reasoning style. The findings concerning correlates of paranoia are broadly similar 
to those found in the wider paranoia literature. That is, paranoia is associated with both negative 
affect and reasoning biases. Associations with externalising bias in patients with schizophrenia 
have been similarly hard to replicate (Garety & Freeman, 2013). What could be different in the 
results in the current review are the potential links with theory of mind impairments.  
There are several factors which potentially limit the generalisability of study 
findings to the wider ASD population. A number of methodological limitations were 
noted, particularly in relation to small sample sizes, possible clinical heterogeneity of 
participants, and measurement bias. There was substantial reliance, across studies, on 
self-report measures. There were limited data available about the internal consistency of 
measures, which is an important aspect to consider, given that the validity and reliability 
of questionnaires is not known for samples with developmental disorders. Also, not all 
studies matched participant groups on baseline variables. Differences in IQ and mental 
health status, between groups, may have served to either over-inflate rates of paranoia, 
or may have affected the way in which clinical groups completed self-report 
questionnaires, e.g. leading to similarities in scores. Finally, non-parametric tests were 
used in some studies, due to small samples or skewed data; tests which may have limited 
power to detect significant differences, or associations between variables.  
 
4.2 Conceptualising paranoia in ASD 
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If replicated in larger samples however, the high levels of paranoia in these ASD 
studies warrant explanation. A framework may aid such investigation. We hypothesise that 
causal and maintaining factors for paranoia in this clinical population share many similarities 
with typically-developing individuals, but that there is also likely to be an ASD-specificity 
which renders this group more vulnerable to developing mental health characteristics and 
paranoid features in particular (see Figure 3 for a schematic representation). First, we suggest 
that the combination of core ASD characteristics (in particular, difficulties with initiating and 
maintaining social interaction, deficits in the quality and quantity of conversational 
interchange, and preferences for routine), and aspects of neuropsychological functioning 
(specifically, weak central coherence, theory of mind impairments, cognitive inflexibility, and 
attentional problems), inform the means through which individuals with ASD think about 
themselves, others, and the world. We suggest that common cognitive styles include 
rumination (e.g. Crane, Goddard & Pring, 2011; Gotham, Bishop, Brunwasser & Lord, 
2014), as well as a tendency for “all or nothing” thinking, over-generalising and 
catastrophising. We speculate that these factors shape the way in which individuals with ASD 
engage in, relate to, and make sense of the social world. For example, this group often have a 
literal interpretation of social norms and conventions, which can result in an inappropriately 
formal, incongruent, or awkward social style. Further, rather than being aware of social nuances 
and subtle variations between social situations – and hence modifying social behaviour 
accordingly – individuals with ASD are more likely to adopt a formulaic approach, rather 
indiscriminately. In a bi-directional fashion, core ASD and associated characteristics affect the 
way in which others respond to them. For example, we note that social experiences for this 
clinical population can often seem, or be, aversive (e.g. being encouraged to engage in social 
situations such as group activities, needing to deal with unexpected social interactions, or being 
unable to undertake routinised behaviours), and/or adverse (e.g. being teased, victimised, or 
rejected). In either instance, social adversity is likely to have a bearing on beliefs, emotions, 
and behavioural responses. Over-generalisation of past experiences may encourage rumination, 
and enhance the propensity for catastrophising about future social situations. It is also plausible 
that these experiences contribute to negative core schema (for example, relating to themes of 
inferiority, worthlessness, a sense of difference, and hence vulnerability), which subsequently 
contribute to assumptions about others, and negative thoughts in situ as well as pre- and post- 
social interactions (for example, “why are they laughing at me?”, “something might happen to 
me”, and “people can’t be trusted”). Additionally, we predict that these difficult experiences 
lead to, or exacerbate pre-existing negative affect, such as anxiety and low mood. Behavioural 
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reactions potentially include an increase in social withdrawal, social isolation, avoidance, 
increased engagement in routines, and rumination. Although these are understandable short-
term behavioural coping strategies, in the longer term they can prove to be unhelpful, as they 
reinforce anxiety, worry, and negative beliefs. We propose therefore that the combination of 
these predisposing factors, difficulties arising in the context of social interactions, and 
cognitive, behavioural, and affective responses, increase the potential for paranoid thoughts, 
general mistrust, and concerns about risk from others.  
 
Figure 3 about here. 
 
4.3 Limitations  
This review has several limitations. First, we excluded non-English language 
publications. Second, because the remit of this review was symptom-focused rather than 
diagnosis-led, we excluded studies that investigated schizophreniform disorders (including 
schizophrenia, psychosis or bipolar affective disorder), or delusional beliefs in ASD, but 
where paranoia data were not reported, i.e. whereby total symptom scale information rather 
than sub-scale scores were provided. Third, we did not contact authors of studies that included 
typically-developing participants recruited due to high levels of paranoia, some of whom may 
conceivably have also met ASD diagnostic criteria.  
 
4.4 Research implications  
Five key areas warrant research. First, study findings suggest that levels of paranoia 
may well be higher in ASD compared with non-clinical controls. This, however, remains to be 
definitively demonstrated. Such future studies could aim to establish whether levels of paranoia 
differ according to ASD diagnosis or symptom profiles, and other characteristics such as IQ, 
sex, and age. Ideally, studies should incorporate objective measures of ASD – in order to 
facilitate investigation of childhood and current symptom profiles – and it would prove useful 
for samples to comprise individuals who have comparable ASD presentations, i.e. 
representing a more homogenous group. Second, we suggest that a more comprehensive 
assessment of neuropsychological functioning processes, including theory of mind, memory, 
and attention, are needed, in order to better understand the extent to which drivers for paranoia 
in ASD are similar or distinct from typically-developing samples. Third, the ecological validity 
of self-report paranoia measures in ASD is uncertain: it may be that some social situations 
described do not apply or statements may be interpreted too literally (Maras & Bowler, 2012). 
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Hence, future studies should include several methods of assessment, such as an informant-
rating or clinician-administered scale, as well as different self-report measures, so as to be 
able to establish the reliability and validity of these instruments, and to enhance 
understanding of the paranoia symptom profile in ASD. Alternatively, virtual reality techniques 
have been used to assess paranoia in typically-developing populations in order to accurately 
assess unfounded ideation (Freeman, 2008b); such methods may also be suitable for 
individuals with ASD (Parsons & Mitchell, 2002). Also, given that similarities have been 
noted in neural substrates of individuals with ASD and schizophrenia (see Pinkham, 
Hopfinger, Pelphrey, Piven & Penn, 2008), (f)MRI studies may facilitate further 
understanding of the biological basis of disorders characterised by impairments in social 
cognition, and associated with paranoia. Fourth, causal and maintaining mechanisms for 
paranoia in ASD clearly require sustained research. Finally, given that paranoia may exacerbate 
psychopathology symptoms, and vice versa, future studies should investigate the potential 
dynamic interaction.   
 
4.5 Clinical implications 
Several implications for clinical practice are pertinent. It is easy to assume that social 
avoidance, and concerns about others’ intentions and actions, are attributable to core ASD 
characteristics. We suggest, however, that clinicians should be mindful that individuals with 
ASD may well have paranoia i.e. excessive mistrust, potentially manifesting in the absence of 
psychosis or schizophrenia. It is therefore pragmatic to establish whether this is the case, so 
as to disentangle contributory factors that account for presenting difficulties. This is likely to 
involve a considered approach on behalf of clinicians, and is contingent on the development of 
rapport and therapeutic trust. Also, it may be that operationalisation of terminology, e.g. 
‘anxiety’ or ‘paranoia’, would prove useful (Attwood, 2004). In terms of treatment, CBT is 
reported to be effective for reducing paranoid features and secondary symptoms (e.g. Freeman 
et al., 2015), although no studies have sought to specifically target paranoia in individuals with 
ASD. We perceive that CBT interventions may well have clinical utility for concomitant 
paranoia in ASD, but that several adaptations may be needed, as is also the case when treating 
other psychiatric comorbidities (Lang et al., 2010; Spain et al., 2015). We suggest that the 
formulation used to guide treatment (at least in the short term) focuses on maintaining 
mechanisms rather than causal factors. Also, due to difficulties with introspection, and 
alexithymia (Bird and Cook, 2013), it may be easier to support individuals with ASD to start 
noticing links between situations, behavioural responses, and beliefs rather than focusing on 
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the role of affect. While cognitive interventions are likely to be crucial, e.g. in order to address 
assumptions and beliefs about the self and others, it may be that an appropriate starting point 
is to offer psycho-education (e.g., about social relationships), social skills interventions (e.g., 
to enhance verbal and non-verbal communication skills), and behavioural techniques (e.g., to 
increase assertiveness skills, and to reduce social withdrawal). Further, it may be that targeting 
other symptoms, e.g. anxiety or low mood may also help to reduce paranoid features. Finally, 
as in treating all paranoia, suitably individualised direct behavioural tests are needed to 
help individuals relearn that they are safe. 
 
4.6 Conclusion   
Paranoia in ASD is an under-researched area, but potentially clinically important. The 
early indications are that levels of paranoia are raised in ASD. There are plausible grounds for 
expecting interactions between ASD core and associated characteristics, and paranoia, with 
each exacerbating the other. However, the mechanisms underlying these relationships are yet 
to receive systematic scrutiny. In this paper we have outlined the findings from the extant 
literature and proposed a framework which may help guide future investigations.  
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Table 1 Overview of included studies 
 
Study  Aims & Design Sample Characteristics Outcome Measurements Results 
  
Blackshaw et 
al. (2001) 
 
UK 
Aim 
To investigate aspects of the 
attributional model of 
paranoia in individuals with 
AS, compared to NCC 
 
Cross-sectional design 
 
Recruitment Source 
ASD: charitable organisations, 
community settings, or postal 
survey  
NCC: informal methods 
 
ASD 
20 males & 5 females 
Age: mean 23 (s.d. 6.8) 
IQ: mean 93 (s.d. 11.5) 
 
NCC 
7 males & 11 females 
Age: mean 31 (s.d. 7.9) 
IQ: mean 110 (s.d. 10.7) 
 
Paranoia 
PS 
 
Theory of Mind 
PIT 
 
Attributional Style 
IPSAQ 
 
Self-representation 
SDQ 
SCS 
 
Anxiety/Depression 
HADS 
 
• ASD participants had higher paranoia scores, 
compared to the NCC participants 
• ToM deficits were more evident in the ASD, 
compared to the NCC group 
• There were no significant differences, between 
groups, in causal attributions: both groups 
used personal and situational external 
attributions; and they were equally as likely to 
attribute negative and positive events to 
themselves 
• There were no significant differences, in self-
context, between groups 
• ASD participants had significantly higher 
levels of private self-consciousness; a variable 
found to be associated with paranoia.  
 
Craig et al. 
(2004) 
 
UK 
Aim 
To investigate relationships 
between theory of mind, 
attributional style, and 
paranoia, in individuals with 
ASD compared to SCZ and 
NCC 
 
Cross sectional design 
 
Recruitment Source 
ASD: support groups 
SCZ: inpatient clinical setting 
NCC: not reported 
 
ASD  
15 males & 2 female 
Age: mean 24 (s.d. 6.7) 
IQ: mean 105 (s.d. 7.1) 
 
SCZ 
11 males & 5 females 
Age: mean 32 (s.d. 9.9) 
IQ: 105 (s.d. 8.4) 
 
NCC 
Paranoia 
PS 
 
Theory of Mind 
RMET 
Hints task 
 
Attributional Style 
ASSI 
 
• Paranoia scores differed between groups: the 
SCZ participants had the highest scores; the 
ASD group had higher scores than the NCC 
group, but lower scores than participants with 
SCZ  
• ToM deficits were comparable between ASD 
and SCZ groups, and greater than the NCC 
group 
• ToM and paranoia were negatively correlated 
in the ASD group 
• There were no significant differences, between 
groups, in attributional style 
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11 males & 5 females 
Age: mean 29 (s.d. 8.4) 
IQ: mean 110 (s.d. 9.9) 
 
Jänsch & Hare 
(2014) 
 
UK 
Aim 
To investigate rates of 
‘Jumping to Conclusions’ 
(JTC) reasoning style in ASD; 
to examine whether rates of 
JTC are higher compared to 
the general population; and to 
explore hypothesised links 
between JTC and paranoia 
  
Cross-sectional design 
Recruitment Source 
ASD: voluntary sector 
NCC: community & university 
samples 
 
ASD 
26 males & 4 females 
Age: mean 32 (s.d. 9.4) 
IQ: mean 112 (s.d. 11.8) 
 
NCC 
26 males & 4 females 
Age: mean 32 (s.d. 10.4) 
IQ: mean 108 (s.d. 10.3) 
 
Paranoia 
GPTS 
 
Theory of Mind 
RMET 
 
JTC – Reasoning Style 
Beads task 
 
• The ASD group endorsed higher levels of 
paranoia compared to the NCC group; the 
distribution of paranoia scores was 
significantly greater for ASD participants 
• ToM deficits were more evident for ASD, 
compared to NCC participants 
• Reasoning style differed between groups: a 
JTC bias was found in 50% of ASD 
participants for version A of the task, and 34%  
of ASD participants in version B 
Maras & 
Bowler (2012) 
 
UK 
Aim 
To investigate interrogative 
suggestibility and compliance 
in adults with ASD compared 
to NCC; and to examine 
potential associations with 
anxiety, self-esteem, and 
paranoia 
 
Cross-sectional design 
Recruitment Source 
ASD: ongoing research projects 
NCC: via advertisements 
 
ASD 
24 males & 8 females 
Age: mean 39 (s.d. 12.4) 
IQ: mean 113 (s.d. 15.9) 
 
NCC 
22 males & 8 females  
Age: mean 42 (s.d. 12.5) 
IQ: mean 108 (s.d. 15.1) 
Paranoia 
PS 
 
Anxiety 
STAI 
FNE 
 
Self Esteem 
RSE 
 
Suggestibility & Compliance 
GCS  
GSS2 
• There were no significant differences, between 
groups, in levels of suggestibility and 
compliance 
• At group level, ASD participants had 
significantly higher PS scores; there were no 
associations between paranoia, suggestibility 
and compliance 
• Anxiety levels differed between groups: ASD 
participants self-reported higher levels of 
anxiety 
• Ratings of self-esteem were comparable 
between groups; neither group scored within 
the low self-esteem range 
 
North et al. 
(2008) 
 
UK 
 
Aim 
To investigate interrogative 
suggestibility and compliance 
in adults with ASD, compared 
to NCC 
Recruitment Source 
ASD: clinical & community sample  
NCC: existing research database 
 
ASD 
Paranoia 
PS 
  
Anxiety 
HADS 
• ASD participants had significantly higher 
scores on the GCS compared to the control 
group; there were no significant differences, 
between groups, on the GSS-2 
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Cross-sectional design 
 
 
21 males & 5 females 
Age: mean 35 (s.d. 11.1) 
IQ: not reported 
 
NCC 
21 males & 6 females 
Age: mean 34 (s.d. 11.9) 
IQ: not reported 
 
FNE 
 
Suggestibility & Compliance 
GCS 
GCS - informant ratings  
GSS-2 
• Levels of paranoia were higher in the ASD 
group 
• There were no significant associations 
between paranoia, suggestibility and 
compliance, for either group 
• Significant differences were found in self-
reported anxiety and depression; ASD 
participants had higher levels of anxiety and 
depression 
• Scores on the FNE differed significantly 
between groups: ASD participants endorsed 
higher levels of concern about negative 
evaluation 
 
Pinkham et al. 
(2012) 
 
USA 
Aim 
To investigate similarities and 
differences in paranoid 
ideation between ASD and 
clinical comparator groups 
(SCZ and SCZ-NP), and NCC 
 
Cross sectional design 
 
Recruitment Source 
ASD: clinical settings & ongoing 
research projects 
SCZ: community settings & 
research projects 
NCC: not reported 
 
ASD 
17 males & 1 females 
Age: mean 25 (s.d. 6.0) 
IQ: not reported 
 
SCZ 
21 male & 3 females 
Age: mean 27 (s.d. 6.0) 
IQ: not reported 
 
SCZ-NP 
25 males & 5 females 
Age: mean 30 (s.d. 7.2) 
IQ: not reported 
 
NCC  
22 males & 7 females 
Paranoia 
PS 
 
 
• PS scores differed between the four groups: 
participants with ASD  had higher paranoia 
scores than NCC and individuals with SCZ-
NP, and lower scores than  the SCZ 
participants 
• Discriminant correspondence analysis 
suggested that the PS could be divided into 
three factors: 1 – paranoia; 2 – social 
cynicism; 3 – insightful acknowledgment 
• Responses on the PS differed somewhat 
between the four groups. Participants with 
ASD had significantly higher levels of social 
cynicism compared to the clinical and NCC 
groups. Conversely, participants with 
schizophrenia (with and without paranoia) had 
significantly higher levels of insightful 
acknowledgment than the ASD group 
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Age: mean 29 (s.d. 5.4) 
IQ: not reported 
 
Taylor et al. 
(2015) 
 
UK 
Aim 
To investigate relationships 
between ASD traits, in 
typically-developing and ASD 
samples, and  psychotic 
experiences occurring  during 
adolescence 
 
Cross-sectional design 
Recruitment Source 
ASD: epidemiological sample 
NCC: epidemiological sample 
 
ASD 
29 males & 3 females 
Age: mean 16 (s.d. 0.68) 
IQ: not reported  
 
NCC 
5,074 participants  
Age: mean 16 (s.d. 0.68) 
IQ: not reported 
 
Paranoia 
SPEQ 
 
Autistic traits 
CAST 
AQ 
 
• Autistic traits were measured at four time 
points; psychotic experiences were assessed at 
one time point 
• Correlations between autistic traits and 
paranoia were not significant, however 
associations approached significance for the 
ASD sample 
• Some associations were found between 
negative symptoms and autistic traits  
 
 
ASD – Autism Spectrum Disorder; NCC –non-clinical control; AS – Asperger Syndrome; IQ – Intelligence Quotient; PS –Paranoia Scale; PIT – projected Imagination task; IPSAQ – Internal, 
Personal, and Situational Attributions Questionnaire; SDQ – Self Discrepancies Questionnaire; SCS – Self Consciousness Scale; HAD – Hospital Anxiety Depression Scale; SCZ – 
schizophrenia; RMET – Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task; ASSI – Attributional Style Structured Interview; JTC – Jumping to Conclusions; GPTS – Green Paranoid Thought Scale; STAI – 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; FNE – Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation scale; RSE – Rosenberg Self Esteem scale; GCS – Gudjonsson Compliance Scale; GSS-2 Gudjonsson Suggestibility 
Scale; SPEQ – Specific Psychotic Experiences Questionnaire; CAST – Childhood Autism Spectrum Test 
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Figure 2 – PRISMA diagram  
 
 
Papers initially indentified
(n = 228)
Papers retrieved for initial screening
(n = 125)
Papers retreived for full-text review
(n = 24)
Papers included in the review
(n = 7 cross-sectional studies; 7 papers)
Additional papers identified 
(n = 1)
Newly published study (n = 1)
Papers excluded 
(n = 18)
Review papers (n = 2)
Duplication of paranoia data (n = 1)  
No paranoia outcome data (n = 14)  
Study sample comprised parents but not 
individuals with ASD (n = 1)
Papers excluded 
as titles & abstracts irrelevant 
(n = 101) 
Duplicate papers excluded
(n = 103)
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Figure 3 Conceptualising Paranoia in ASD 
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